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Abstract
While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping
immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper,
we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information
on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with
immigration. We ¯nd robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest
groups play a statistically signi¯cant and economically relevant role in shaping migra-
tion across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest
groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are
more important.
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1\Immigration policy today is driven by businesses that need more workers | skilled and
unskilled, legal and illegal." Goldsborough (2000)
1 Introduction
On May 1, 2006, over a million demonstrators ¯lled US TV screens. They were mainly
Latinos, who marched peacefully through America's cities in the hope that Congress would
¯nally introduce legislation to overhaul the country's immigration policy. A year later, a
bipartisan legislation was proposed by Senators Ted Kennedy and John Kyl, but since it was
unveiled, \it has been stoned from all sides "(The Economist, May 24, 2007). Even though
many observers have deemed the status quo unacceptable, no measures have been voted yet.
What determines US immigration policy today? In particular, are political-economy
factors important in shaping immigration to the United States? What is the role played
by industry-speci¯c interest groups? In this paper, we address these issues by analyzing the
impact of political organization by business lobbies and workers' associations on the structure
of U.S. migration policy across sectors between 2001 and 2005. This paper represents, to
the best of our knowledge, the ¯rst study to provide systematic empirical evidence on the
political-economy determinants of today's immigration to the U.S. and, in particular, on the
role played by interest groups.
Trade and migration represent two of the main facets of international economic integra-
tion. A vast theoretical and empirical literature considers the political-economy determinants
of trade policy trying to explain the political constraints that work against free trade. In
contrast, the literature on the political economy of migration policy is very thin and mainly
theoretical. So far, in analyzing the determinants of international labor °ows, the migration
literature has mostly focused on supply factors, i.e. factors which a®ect the willingness of
workers to move across borders. On the other hand, the analysis of the drivers of the demand
side of international migration, the most important being migration policies in developed
countries, has not received as much attention.1 This is in spite of the fact that, as trade
restrictions have been drastically reduced, the bene¯ts from the elimination of existing trade
barriers are much smaller than the gains that could be achieved by freeing international
migration.2 This gap in the literature is very surprising and can be partly explained by
1For example, Borjas (1994) points out that \the literature does not yet provide a systematic analysis of
the factors that generate the host country demand function for immigrants." (page 1693). See Section 2 for
a discussion of the related literature.
2A recent World Bank study estimates that the bene¯ts to poor countries of rich countries allowing only
2unavailability of data. The purpose of this paper is to o®er a contribution towards ¯lling
this gap.
There exists abundant anecdotal evidence which suggests that political-economy factors
and, in particular, interest groups play a key role in shaping U.S. immigration policy. Starting
from the very birth of organized labor and for most of their history, unions have been actively
engaged in e®orts to limit in°ows of foreign workers. The enactment of the ¯rst legislative
measure to systematically limit immigration from a speci¯c country | the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882 | was the result of the e®orts of the newly founded Federation of Organized
Trade and Labor Unions. Similarly, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) played an
important role in the introduction of the Literacy Test provision in the 1917 Immigration Act,
with the explicit intent to \screen and reduce the in°ow of unskilled workers in the U.S labor
force" (Briggs (1998), page 125). More recently, the AFL-CIO supported measures to reduce
illegal immigration, that culminated in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.
Similarly, during the recent debate on shortage of nurses, the American Nurses Association
has strongly opposed a measure to increase the number of H1-C visas, pointing out that
\...the provision would lead to a °ood of nurse immigrants and would damage the domestic
work force" (New York Times, May 24 2006).
At the same time, complementarities among production factors are fundamental in un-
derstanding the behavior of pressure groups. In the past, active subsidization of immigration
has been demanded and obtained by business associations in many labor{scarce countries,
as has been extensively documented by Timmer and Williamson (1996). The position of
business lobbies in favor of migration is also consistent with more recent anecdotal evidence.
For instance, in the aftermath of the 2006 midterm elections, the vice- president of Tech-
net, a lobbying group for technology companies, stressed that the main goal of the reforms
proposed by her group is the relaxation of migration policy constraints (CIO, December 19
2006. Available at http://www.cio.com/article/27581/.)
In addition, new visa categories have been introduced as the result of lobbying activities.
An interesting example is the case of H2R visas. In 2005, the quota for H2B visas was ¯lled
with none of them going to the seafood industry in Maryland.3 This industry started heavy
lobbying of the Maryland senator Barbara A. Mikulski who was able to add a last-minute
a 3 percent rise in their labor force by relaxing migration restrictions is US$300 billion per year (Pritchett
2006). For similar results see also Hamilton and Whalley (1984).
3H2B visas are for temporary workers in unskilled, seasonal, non-agricultural occupations (for example
in the planting-pine-trees industry; the resort industry, the seafood industry, the gardening industry in the
North of the United States etc.).
3amendment to the Tsunami Relief Act (P.L. 109-13) of May 11, 2005 (Cox News May 4,
2006). As a result, a new visa category was introduced (H2R visas). The requirements for
H2R visas are the same as for H2B visas, but there is no quota: As long as the individual
has held an H2B visa in one of the previous three ¯scal years, he can get an H2R visa. This
has substantially expanded the number of temporary, non{agricultural workers allowed to
enter the country.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we start by developing a simple theoretical frame-
work. We show that, in a given sector, the more politically{organized labor invests in
lobbying expenditures, the higher the level of protection and, hence, the lower the number
of immigrants. At the same time, the more politically{organized business owners spend
on lobbying, the less restrictive migration policy and, therefore, the higher the number of
immigrants in a given sector.
We use a new, U.S., industry{level dataset that we create by combining information on
the number of visas across sectors with data on the political activities of organized groups,
both in favor and against an increase in migration. The data set covers the period between
2001 and 2005. In order to proxy for the political organization of anti-migration lobbying
groups, we use data on workers' union membership rates across sectors, from the Current
Population Survey. In addition, and most importantly, we take advantage of a novel dataset
developed by the Center for Responsive Politics, that allows us to identify ¯rms' lobbying
expenditures by targeted policy area. We are thus able to use information on business lob-
bying expenditures that are speci¯cally channeled towards shaping immigration policy. This
represents a substantial improvement in the quality of the data relative to the existing in-
ternational economics literature which has used, instead, political action committees (PAC)
contributions. First, PAC contributions represent only a small fraction (10%) of targeted
political activity, the remainder being made up by lobbying expenditures. Second, PAC con-
tributions cannot be disaggregated by issue and, thus, cannot be easily linked to a particular
policy.
Our ¯ndings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. In particular,
we show that both pro{ and anti{migration interest groups play a statistically signi¯cant
and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. We ¯nd that barriers to
migration are { ceteris paribus { higher in sectors where labor unions are more important,
and lower in those sectors in which business lobbies are more active. Our preferred esti-
mates suggest that a 10% increase in the size of lobbying expenditures by business groups
per native worker is associated with a 2.9% larger number of visas per native worker, while
4a one-percentage-point increase in union density { for example, moving from 10 to 11 per-
centage points, which amounts to a 10% increase in union membership rate { reduces it by
3.2%. The results are robust introducing a number of industry-level control variables (e.g.
output, prices, origin country e®ects, etc.) and to addressing endogeneity issues with an
instrumental-variable estimation strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant lit-
erature, while Section 3 describes migration policy in the United States and provides the
motivation for focusing on industry-speci¯c aspects of U.S. migration policy. Section 4 de-
scribes the main features and predictions of the theoretical model (fully developed in the
Appendix). Section 5 describes the data, while the results of our empirical analysis are
reported in section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature
There are only few studies that analyze the politics of distortions in international factor
movements. This is surprising given that other dimensions of globalization have been exten-
sively analyzed. For example, a large body of theoretical and empirical literature is devoted
to understanding the political economy of protection in international trade. Furthermore,
while in this literature the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) has
emerged as the leading framework to understand the commercial policy formation process,
a uni¯ed framework to understand migration policy has yet to emerge.4 In what follows, we
¯rst review the existing theoretical literature on the political economy of migration policy,
starting with direct democracy models and turning next to settings in which the lobbying
activities of organized groups play a key role. Second, we discuss the (scarce) empirical
evidence on these issues.
In a seminal contribution, Benhabib (1996) considers the human capital requirements that
would be imposed on potential immigrants by an income-maximizing polity under majority
voting. Output is modeled using a constant returns to scale production function combining
labor with human (or physical) capital. Both factors are internationally mobile. The median
voter chooses to admit individuals who supply a set of factors that are complementary to
her own endowment. As a result, if the median voter is unskilled, he will choose a policy
that sets a lower bound on the skill level of the immigrants, that is only skilled foreigners
4For an overview of the trade literature, see the surveys by Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1997), and Gawande
and Krishna (2003). Facchini (2004) surveys instead the literature on political economy models of trade and
factor mobility.
5will be admitted. On the other hand, if the median voter is highly educated, he will set an
upper bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and thus will be in favor of admitting only
individuals with low levels of education. The main shortcoming of this analysis is that the
optimal policy does not identify the actual size of the in°ows. This is clearly at odds with
the policies followed by countries all around the world, which are characterized by quotas.
In our theoretical framework the presence of a ¯xed factor will instead allow us to determine
the politically optimal number of immigrants to be admitted.
A di®erent solution to this problem has been proposed by Ortega (2005), who extends
Benhabib's model to a dynamic setting to explore the trade o® between the short run eco-
nomic impact of immigration and its medium to long run political e®ect. In particular,
while immigration a®ects only the labor market in the current period, in the future it also
in°uences the political balance of the destination country, as the descendants of migrants
gain the right to vote. As a result, on the one hand, skilled natives prefer an immigration
policy that admits unskilled foreign workers since, due to complementarities in production,
this policy will increase the skilled wage. On the other, the arrival of unskilled immigrants
and the persistency of skill levels across generations can give rise to a situation in which
unskilled workers gain the political majority and, therefore, vote for policies that bene¯t
them as a group. Thus, through the political channel, skilled natives prefer an immigration
policy that admits skilled foreign workers. The interplay between these two forces allows
Ortega to characterize under which conditions an equilibrium migration quota might arise,
i.e. to derive a prediction in terms of the size of migration in°ows.5
The paper in the migration literature that is most closely related to our work is Fac-
chini and Willmann (2005). Using the menu auction framework pioneered by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), the authors model the determination of policies towards international
factor mobility as the result of the interaction between organized groups and an elected
politician. Using a one{good multiple factors framework, Facchini and Willmann (2005)
¯nd that policies depend on both whether a production factor is represented or not by a
lobby and on the degree of substitutability/complementarity between factors. Our theoret-
ical framework di®ers from their model in two ways. On the one hand, we explicitly link
equilibrium policies to actual lobbying expenditures, rather than to whether a factor is orga-
nized or not. Secondly, we consider a multi{sector environment, which allows us to analyze
5The median voter approach has also been used in the large literature analyzing the impact of immigration
on the recipient country's welfare system. Among the many papers see Mazza and van Winden (1996), Razin,
Sadka, and Swagel (2002), Scholten and Thum (1996), Razin and Sadka (1999) and the literature surveyed
in the recent volume by Krieger (2005).
6how lobbying expenditures by industry a®ect migration policy.6
The economics literature lacks a systematic empirical analysis of the political-economy
factors that a®ect contemporary migration. On the other hand, we have historical accounts
of the political economy of immigration restrictions between the end of the XIX century and
the beginning of the XX century (Goldin 1994, Timmer and Williamson 1996). In particular,
in her study of the introduction of the 1917 literacy test, Goldin (1994) points out how capital
owners have been against this restrictive measure, notwithstanding the initial fear of labor
upheavel fuelled by foreign workers. Similarly, she also documents how both the AFL and
the Knight of Labor were among the supporters of the introduction of this measure as early
as 1897.
While the empirical literature on individual attitudes towards immigrants is closely re-
lated to the topic,7 in general it does not examine how attitudes translate into migration
policy outcomes.8 The only empirical work we could ¯nd that indirectly looks at the political-
economy determinants of current migration policy is Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001). This
paper focuses on U.S. border enforcement and shows that it softens when sectors using illegal
immigrants expand. The authors suggest that \sectors that bene¯t greatly from lower bor-
der enforcement lobby politicians on the issue, while sectors that bene¯t modestly are less
politically active." The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate this conjecture { that lob-
bying a®ects immigration policy { though in the context of legal immigration to the United
States.
3 Migration Policy in the United States
Current legislation in the United States distinguishes two main channels for non{citizens to
enter the country legally: permanent (immigrant) admission and temporary (non{immigrant)
admission. Individuals granted permanent admission are classi¯ed as \lawful permanent res-
idents" (LPR) and receive a green card. They are allowed to work in the United States and
may apply for US citizenship. Foreigners entering the country as non immigrants are instead
6Recently, a small theoretical literature has emerged which explicitly models the role played by organized
groups in shaping migration policy in a setting with imperfectly competitive factor markets. Amegashie
(2004) and Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2006) are examples of this approach. Our analysis will instead be
based on competitive factor markets, where no unemployment occurs in equilibrium.
7See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), O'Rourke and Sinnott (2004), Hanson,
Scheve, and Slaughter (2007), Facchini and Mayda (2008b).
8The only exceptions are two very recent works, Facchini and Mayda (2008a) and Krishnakumar and
Mueller (2008).
7not allowed to work, except for those admitted under speci¯c categories. Non immigrants
cannot directly apply for naturalization as they ¯rst need to be granted LPR status.
The distinction between permanent immigrants and temporary non{immigrants has been
¯rst introduced in the Steerage Act of 1819, but it was only with the Immigration Act of
1907 that aliens have been required to declare themselves as either permanent immigrants
or temporary non{immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1924 introduced several classes of
temporary admission, based on the purpose of the initial entry, and successive legislation
has further expanded their number. More recently, the immigration policy in the US has
been disciplined by the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) of 1990 and its successive
modi¯cations.
As for the acquisition of LPR status, current policies identify a set of preferences, ¯xing
an annual °exible quota of 416,000 to 675,000 for family{sponsored preferences, employment
preferences and diversity immigrants. Immediate relatives (spouses and children of US cit-
izens and parents of adult US citizens) are exempt from the annual numeric limits set for
preferences. Interestingly, recent data shows that immediate relatives of US citizens account
today for over 40% of annual LPR in°ows (CBO (2006)). Refugees and asylum seekers are
also exempt from preference limits. The number of refugees admitted each year is set by the
US President and, for the period 2003{2007, the cap has been ¯xed at 70,000 admissions per
year. There is instead no numeric limit for asylum seekers.
As for admissions as a non{immigrant, 5,735,577 visas were issued on average per year
during the 2001-2005 period.9 Among non{immigrant visas, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween \work and related visas" and \other admissions". The latter category includes tem-
porary visitors, o±cial representatives, transitional family members and students plus their
spouses/children. \Other admissions" represent approximately eighty{¯ve percent of the
total number of non{immigrant visas issued in 2001{2005.
During the same period, 835,294 work and related visas were approved on average every
year. Of these, 315,372 are issued to what the Department of Homeland Security classi¯es
as \Temporary workers", which includes well known visa categories such as: H1B (workers
of distinguished merit and ability), H1A & H1C (registered nurses and nurses in shortage
area), H2A (workers in agricultural services), H2B (workers in other services), H3 (trainees)
and H4 (spouses and children of temporary workers). The other work and related visas are
assigned to, for example, \workers with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education,
business, or athletics " (O1, O2), \internationally recognized athletes or entertainers" (P1,
9Notice that this number does not include individuals admitted under the visa waiver program.
8P2, P3), \religious workers" (R1) and \exchange visitors" (J1). See Table 3 for a summary
of the numbers of visas issued under each category.
The characteristics as well as the application procedures vary substantially across visa
categories. For instance, H1B visas are used to employ a foreign worker in a \specialty oc-
cupation" which, in general, requires the applicant to hold at least a bachelor's degree. The
visa is issued for three years and can be renewed once, up to six years of total employment.
An employer who intends to hire a foreign worker under the H1B program must follow three
steps. First, he needs to submit a labor condition application (LCA) to the US Depart-
ment of Labor. Importantly, the employer must document that the perspective H1B visa
holder will receive a wage that is no lower than the prevailing wage for the same position in
the geographic area or the wage actually paid by the employer to individuals with similar
workplace characteristics. The employer must also attest that the working conditions of US
workers similarly employed will not be adversely a®ected. Once the LCA has been certi¯ed,
the employer ¯les a petition to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (US-
CIS). In the petition the employer needs to substantiate the potential worker's education
and quali¯cations. Finally, once the USCIS has approved the petition, a visa will be issued
by the State Department if the individual lives abroad. If instead the individual is already
living in the United States, the USCIS will convert the visa status to H1B.
Another interesting example is represented by the P visa category reserved to \interna-
tionally recognized athletes or entertainers". To be admitted under a P visa, an athlete or
team must be internationally recognized which, according to USCIS, means \having a high
level of achievement in a ¯eld, evidenced by a degree of skill and recognition substantially
above that ordinarily encountered, to the extent that such achievement is renowned, leading,
or well-known in more than one country." For instance, major{league baseball teams are able
to hire players under the P visa category, while players in minor{league teams do not qualify
(Cox News May 4, 2006.)
Importantly, many work visa categories are subject to an explicit quota set by Congress10
For instance, this is the case for H1A, H1B, and up to 2005 for H2B visas. Whether a visa
program is constrained or not by a quota is likely to be the result of lobbying activities. For
instance, universities and government research laboratories were able to obtain a permanent
exemption from the overall H1B quota starting in 2000. Moreover, the introduction in 2005 of
the new H2R visa category { brought about by the lobbying activity of the Maryland seafood
industry { has in practice eliminated the quota for non agricultural temporary workers (H2B).
10By quotas we mean the number of visas that policymakers set ex ante.
9Table 1: Number and types of non{immigrant visa issuances, 2001{2005
Type of temporary admission Visa Category Average 2001{2005
Work and related visas 835,294
Exchange visitors and spouses/children J1, J2 291,241
Workers with extraordinary ability O1, O2 8,865
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers P1, P2, P3 32,762
Cultural Exchange and Religious Workers Q1, Q2, R1 10,414
Treaty traders/investors and their children E 35,282
Spouses/children of certain foreign workers O3, P4, Q3, R2, I 21,469
NAFTA Professionals and spouses/children TN, TD 2,124
Intracompany transferees and spouses/children L1, L2 117,765
Temporary workers of which:
Workers of distinguished merit and ability H1B 130,051
Registered nurses and nurses in shortage area H1A, H1C 122
Workers in agricultural services H2A 31,322
Workers in other services H2B 72,684
Trainees H3 1,518
Spouses and children of temporary workers H4 79,675
Other admissions 4,900,283
Temporary Visitors B1, B2, B1/B2 4,154,485
B1/B2/BCC
O±cial representatives and transitional family members A, G, K 165,141
Students and spouses/children F1, F2, M1, M2 266,099
Other non work visas 314,558
Total non immigrant visa issuances 5,735,577
Notes: Data are based on the `Report of the Visa O±ce' (http://travel.state.gov), 2001{2005.
Notice that aliens issued a visa do not necessarily enter the United States in the year of issuance.
In this paper we will focus on temporary non{immigrant visas and, in particular, on work
visas. In other words, we will not use the number of employment{based green cards, for the
following two reasons: The ¯rst and most relevant one is that green cards based on em-
ployment preferences represent a very small fraction of the overall number of LPR admitted
every year. For instance, in 2001, out of 1,064,318 individuals who were granted permanent
resident status, only 179,195 (16.8% of the total) were admitted under the employment-
preference category and this number even includes their spouses and children. The second
reason is that we were not able to obtain data, from the Department of Homeland Security,
on employment{based green cards by sector, which is the level at which we carry out our
10analysis.
Looking at the wide variety of existing non{immigrant work visas, one can immediately
notice that some categories are clearly occupation/sector speci¯c. For instance, H1A &
H1C visas are for nurses, H2A visas are for temporary agricultural workers, R1 visas are for
religious workers, P visas are for performing artists and outstanding sportsmen, etc. At the
same time, other important visa categories cannot be immediately linked to a speci¯c sector.
This is true for instance for H1B, L1 and H2B visas.
Whether there exists or not a visa speci¯c to a sector is likely to be a function of the
lobbying activities carried out by that particular sector. For example, H1C visas for nurses
were introduced in 1999 in the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act (NRDAA) (Pub.
L. No. 106-95) as the result of ¯erce lobbying by hospitals and nursing homes. Similarly, the
H-2 program was created in 1943 when the Florida sugar cane industry obtained permission
to hire Caribbean workers, with temporary visas, to cut sugar cane.11 On the other hand,
many other sectors have been less successful in obtaining a visa program speci¯cally targeted
to their needs. This is for instance the case of sectors that receive immigrants mainly through
programs like the H1B or H2B, which are characterized by an overall quota but no explicit
sector{speci¯c allocation. Still, the intensive lobbying activity carried out even by ¯rms
active in these sectors suggests that the policymaker's ¯nal allocation of visas issued under
the H1B or H2B programs across sectors is likely to be in°uenced by lobbying activities.12
In addition whether sector speci¯c quotas exist or not, the data suggest that lobby-
ing on immigration takes place at the sectoral level, since the top contributors are of-
ten associations representing speci¯c industries, for example the American Hospital As-
sociation, the American Nursery and Landscape Association, the National Association of
Homebuilders and National Association of Computer Consultant Businesses, etc. (See
http://www.opensecrets.org.)13
11Recently Congressman Anthony Weiner (NY) has proposed a bill to create a new visa category especially
for models interested in working in the United States to bene¯t the New York fashion industry. See The
Economist June 21, 2008 \Beauty and the geek".
12Lobbying on the overall quota for visa programs that cover multiple sectors is likely to be a®ected by
free riding.
13In 2005, American Hospital Association alone contributed about 10 percent of the lobbying expenditures
for immigration.
114 Theoretical framework
Recent rational choice analyses have pointed out how interest groups can directly participate
in the political process in at least two ways. On the one hand, they provide substantive in-
formation to policy makers. On the other, they o®er ¯nancial incentives to in°uence policy
outcomes. In the international economics literature the most in°uential approach, pioneered
by Grossman and Helpman (1994), has emphasized the second \quid pro quo"view and, in
particular, the role of direct campaign contributions in shaping policies.14 Formally, Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) have proposed an analytical foundation for a political support
function that is based on the politician including pressure groups' campaign contributions
directly in its objective function. While this approach has been very successful and can be
thought of as the current paradigm in the literature on endogenous trade policy, an impor-
tant feature of this model is that \the existence of a lobby matters in equilibrium, and not
its actual contribution level..."(Eicher and Osang 2002).15 Furthermore, the Grossman and
Helpman (1994) model ignores the important informational channel through which lobbies
can also in°uence policy and the data shows that, if anything, businesses might perceive
\informational" lobbying to be at least as important as campaign contributions.16 To char-
acterize the link between equilibrium policy outcomes and contributions and to allow for
a more general role of lobbies, we have decided to use a \protection formation function"
approach. 17 According to this view, government policy is simply a function of the expen-
14More generally, our view is that the reward to a politician for a political favor might take much more
complicated forms than direct campaign contributions. For instance, politicians can receive gifts from lobby-
ists, like dinners and trips. In addition, often politicians at the end of their career become themselves active
lobbyists and, in some cases, are able to earn substantial rewards for carrying out their activities in this
role. According to the CRP website, \Lobbying ¯rms were still able to ¯nd 129 former members of Congress
willing to lobby on everything from postal rates to defense appropriations. Former Rep. Bob Livingston
(R-La.), who was once days away from becoming Speaker of the House, drummed up $1.14 million in business
in his ¯rst year as an independent lobbyist."
15In the protection-for-sale approach, the relationship between equilibrium policy outcome and contri-
butions cannot be characterized under general assumptions and, more importantly, the direction of this
relationship is not necessarily intuitive, as it depends on the bargaining power of the players (see Goldberg
and Maggi (1999)). As Grossman and Helpman (1994) point out, if there is only one lobby interacting with
the elected politician, the lobby will capture all the surplus from the relationship, keeping the policy maker
at the same welfare level as in a world with free trade and no payments carried out by the lobby. On the
other hand, if all sectors are organized, the policy implemented will be free trade - thus no favor will be
received by any lobby in the political equilibrium - and the government will capture all the surplus from the
relationship (page 845{847). For more on this important issue, see also Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
16See Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) and the discussion contained in section 5.1. For recent theoret-
ical models of informational lobbying, see Bennedsen and Feldman (2006), Dahm and Porteiro (2004) and
Lohmann (1995).
17A more general framework, which allows not only for the quid pro quo but also the informational channel,
is the most appropriate given the data we use, i.e. data on lobbying expenditures which do not end up directly
12ditures undertaken by pro and anti{immigration groups, and we refrain from spelling out
more in detail how interest groups actually a®ect the political process.
We develop the theoretical framework of the paper in the Appendix. In this section, we
provide a description of the main assumptions and predictions of the model. We consider
a small open economy { both in the goods' and factors' market { with n + 1 sectors. Our
framework is based on a short-run view of the economy in which factors are sector-speci¯c
or, in other words, labor markets are segmented by industry.18 The numeraire sector uses
only sector{speci¯c labor, while the output of all other sectors is produced using sector{
speci¯c labor, which we assume to be internationally mobile, and a ¯xed factor (capital).
The assumption of a small open economy implies that both international goods and factor
prices are given. Consumers are characterized by a separable, quasi{linear utility function.
Finally, restrictions to the physical relocation of people across countries take the form of a
(binding) quota.19
Inspired by the pioneering contributions of Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and Eicher and
Osang (2002), we model measures towards labor mobility in each sector as the result of
expenditures by a pro{migration lobby (made up by capital owners) and by an anti{migration
lobby (made up by workers). The relationship between lobbying expenditures and the ¯nal
policy outcome is modeled using a `protection function approach'. The two lobbies play
a non cooperative game and we show that in equilibrium, in a given sector, the amount of
protection a®orded to labor { i.e., the restrictiveness of the policy adopted by the government
{ depends on both the lobbying expenditures made by organized labor, as well as on the
expenditures made by capital. In particular, if organized labor in a sector contributes more,
this will ceteris paribus imply higher levels of protection from foreign in°ows of workers
and, hence, lower the equilibrium number of immigrants. At the same time, if organized
business owners spend more, this will ceteris paribus make migration policy in that sector
less restrictive and, therefore, increase the number of immigrants.
in policymakers' hands. In general, lobbying expenditures are used both to pay lobbyists for their work of
talking and informing policymakers and, less transparently, to provide ¯nancial incentives to politicians.
18This assumption is consistent with our focus on sector-speci¯c aspects of migration policy.
19We can reinterpret the policy tool more broadly as the result of: quotas on sector{speci¯c visas; the
allocation to a given sector of visas which are not sector speci¯c; and more general regulations that a®ect
the in°ow of foreign workers in speci¯c sectors.
135 Data
In this section we ¯rst provide background information on lobbying expenditures. Next, we
describe the sources of the other data we use in the empirical analysis. Finally, we present
summary statistics for the main variables used in the regressions.
5.1 Lobbying expenditures
In the United States, special interest groups can legally in°uence the policy formation process
by o®ering campaign ¯nance contributions or by carrying out lobbying activities.20
Campaign ¯nance contributions and, in particular, contributions by political action com-
mittees (PAC) have been the focus of the literature (see for example Snyder 1990, Goldberg
and Maggi 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). Yet PAC contributions are not the
only route by which interest groups' money might be able to in°uence policy makers and,
given the existing limits on the size of PAC contributions (see Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose
(2000) for details), it is likely that they are not the most important one. In particular, it
has been pointed out that lobbying expenditures are of \... an order of magnitude greater
than total PAC expenditure" (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000). Hence, it is surprising
that so few empirical papers have looked at the e®ectiveness of lobbying activities in shaping
policy outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, only a recent article by de Figueiredo and
Silverman (2006) has taken a close look at this issue.21
One important reason for this relative lack of interest is that, while PAC contributions
data has been available for a long time, only with the introduction of the Lobbying Disclo-
sure Act of 1995, individuals and organizations have been required to provide a substantial
amount of information on their lobbying activities. Starting from 1996, all lobbyists22 must
20According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, the term \lobbying activities" refers to \lobbying
contacts and e®orts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and
other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination
with the lobbying activities of others." The term \lobbying contact" refers instead to \any oral or written
communication (including an electronic communication) to a covered executive branch o±cial or a covered
legislative branch o±cial that is made on behalf of a client with regard to (i) the formulation, modi¯cation,
or adoption of Federal legislation (including legislative proposals); (ii) the formulation, modi¯cation, or
adoption of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position of the
United States Government; (iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy (including
the negotiation, award, or administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or license); or (iv) the
nomination or con¯rmation of a person for a position subject to con¯rmation by the Senate."
21In particular, the authors ¯nd that for a university with representation in the House or Senate appro-
priations committees, a 10% increase in lobbying yields a 3 to 4% increase in earmark grants obtained by
the university.
22An individual is de¯ned as a \lobbyist" for a particular client if he/she makes more than one \lobbying
14¯le semi{annual reports to the Secretary of the Senate's O±ce of Public Records (SOPR),
listing the name of each client (¯rm) and the total income they have received from each of
them. At the same time, all ¯rms with in-house lobbying departments are required to ¯le
similar reports stating the dollar amount they have spent.23
Importantly, legislation requires the disclosure not only of the dollar amounts actually
received/spent, but also of the issues for which lobbying is carried out (Table A2 shows a
list of 76 general issues at least one of which has to be entered by the ¯ler). The report
¯led by a lobbying ¯rm, Morrison Public A®airs Group, on behalf of O'Grady Peyton Intl (a
subsidiary of AMN Health Care Services) for the period January-June 2004 is shown in Table
A3. As it can be seen, O'Grady Peyton Intl's report lists only one issue, i.e. immigration.
Another example is a report ¯led by a client, i.e. Microsoft corporation, for its lobbying
expenditures between January - June 2005 (Table A4). Besides immigration, Microsoft lists
other six issues in this report (not shown). Thus, the new legislation provides access to a
wealth of information, and the purpose of this paper is to use it to assess how lobbying
in°uences migration policy.
The data on lobbying expenditures is compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics
(CRP) in Washington D.C., using the semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports, which are
posted in its website. The reports analyzed by CRP cover lobbying activity that took place
from 1998 through 2005. Due to unavailability of data on other variables, particularly visas,
we restrict the analysis in this paper to the period 2001-2005. Annual lobbying expendi-
tures and incomes (of lobbying ¯rms) are calculated by adding mid-year totals and year-end
totals.24 CRP also matches each ¯rm to an industry.
We de¯ne \overall" or \total" lobbying expenditures in an industry as the sum of lobbying
expenditures by all ¯rms in that industry on any issue. The lobbying expenditures for
immigration in an industry are calculated instead using a three-step procedure. First, only
those ¯rms are considered which list \immigration" as an issue in their lobbying report.25
Second, the total expenditure of these ¯rms is split equally between the issues they lobbied
contact" and the \lobbying activities" he is involved with constitute at least 20 percent of the individual's
time in services for that client over any six-month period.
23A ¯rm could be a subsidiary of a parent ¯rm or the parent ¯rm itself if there are no subsidiaries. In the
former (latter) case, CRP provides lobbying expenditure data at the subsidiary (parent-¯rm) level. Notice
that di®erent subsidiaries of the same parent ¯rm can be associated with di®erent industries. Finally, the
list of ¯rms includes many industry associations.
24Whenever there is a discrepancy between data on income and expenditures, CRP uses information from
lobbying reports on expenditure.
25The lobbying dataset from 2001-2005 comprises an unbalanced panel of a total of 12,376
¯rms/associations of ¯rms, out of which 481 list immigration as an issue in at least one year.
15for. Finally, these ¯rm-level expenditures on immigration are aggregated for all ¯rms within
a given industry. For robustness, we also use another measure of lobbying expenditure on
migration which is based on the total lobbying expenditure of ¯rms who write down migration
as an issue in their report.
As shown in Table 2, between 1999 and 2004,26 interest groups have spent on average
about 3.8 billion U.S. dollars per political cycle on targeted political activity, which includes
PAC campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures.27 Lobbying expenditures represent
by far the bulk of all interest groups money (close to ninety percent). Therefore, the focus
of the literature on the role of PAC contributions in shaping policies might be misleading
for at least two reasons. First, PAC contributions represent only a small fraction of interest
groups' targeted political activity (10 percent), and any analysis of the role of lobbies in
shaping policy based on only these ¯gures could be misleading. Second, linking campaign
contributions to particular policy issues is very di±cult and often requires some ad-hoc
assumptions. For instance, in their pioneering work on the estimation of Grossman and
Helpman (1994) protection for sale model, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have used minimum
PAC expenditure thresholds to identify whether a sector was organized or not from the point
of view of trade policy determination. The availability of direct information on the main
purposes of the lobbying activity provides a clear advantage in linking lobbying expenditures
to actual outcomes.
The importance of doing so is shown in Figure 1 { which is based on the average over
three election cycles { where in the top panel we have a scatter plot of overall lobbying
expenditures and PAC contributions, while in the bottom panel we have a scatter plot of
lobbying expenditures associated with immigration policy and PAC contributions. In the
top panel, we ¯nd a very high correlation between total lobbying expenditures and PAC
contributions across sectors. This result is consistent with the political science literature
and may suggest that PAC contributions are integral to groups' lobbying e®orts and that
they allow them to gain access to policymakers (Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002).
In contrast, the very low correlation between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures
for migration policy, in the bottom panel, is striking. It suggests that, if we were to use
26Table 2 and Figure 1 are based also on data for the political cycle 1999-2000, which we cannot use in
the empirical analysis since visa data is not available for these years.
27We follow the literature that excludes from targeted-political-activity ¯gures \soft money" contributions,
which went to parties for general party{building activities not directly related to Federal campaigns; in
addition, soft money contributions were not subject to any limits and cannot be associated with any particular
interest or issue (see Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000 and Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002). Soft
money contributions have been banned by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.
16the data on PAC contributions { assuming they are associated with immigration { we might
obtain misleading results. Hence the use of our new dataset is fundamental in order to clearly
identify how lobbying a®ects migration policy.
5.2 Other Data
The information on lobbying expenditures is merged with data on visas and on a number
of control variables. Data on visas covers the following letter categories: H1A, H1B, H1C,
H2A, J1, O1, O2, P1, P2, P3, R1 (see Table 1). The other two potentially relevant work visa
categories are L1 (intracompany transferees) and H2B (non{agricultural temporary workers)
but unfortunately we were not able to obtain data on these visas by sector. We gathered
information on the number of H1B visas approved by sector from the USCIS.28 The data
on H1B petitions approved at the ¯rm level is aggregated by the USCIS at the industry
level according to the NAICS classi¯cation. Finally, the ¯gures for the other types of work
visas we have used come from the yearly `Report of the Visa O±ce', available online at
http://travel.state.gov.
We also use data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series - Current Population
Survey (IPUMS-CPS) for the years between 2001 and 2005. The IPUMS-CPS data set is
based on the March Annual Demographic File and Income Supplement to the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). It contains individual-level information on a range of socio-economic
characteristics, such as: industry; employment status; birthplace; nativity (foreign-born vs.
native-born); union/employee association membership; education and wages and salary in-
come. We use CPS data restricted to individuals aged 18-64 who participate in the civilian
labor force. Following the theoretical framework, workers are di®erentiated according to
their industry of employment. The variable ind1950 in the IPUMS-CPS is used to obtain
information on the industry in which the worker performs or performed { in his most recent
job, if unemployed at the time of the survey { his or her primary occupation. This variable
uses the 1950 Census Bureau industrial classi¯cation system. The list of CPS industries is
shown in Table A5.
The IPUMS-CPS data set contains information at the individual level, which is aggre-
gated to the industry level to construct the following variables: total number of natives,
fraction of union members, fraction of unemployed, and mean weekly earnings. To construct
the latter three variables, we restrict the sample to natives, who are de¯ned as native-born
28This data was kindly provided by James Fitzsimmons.
17respondents, regardless of whether their parents are native-born or foreign-born. The weekly
earnings are de°ated using the U.S. GDP de°ator from the IMF. All the variables are con-
structed using sampling weights as recommended by the IPUMS-CPS.
While we have direct information on the lobbying expenditures by capital owners (i.e.
¯rms), our measure for workers is only indirect as CRP does not provide data on lobbying
expenditures by unions at the industry level.29 Thus, we use the fraction of natives who
are union members in each industry as our measure of political organization of labor in that
sector. The rationale for this choice is that, in sectors where the union membership rate
is higher, the free-rider problem associated with lobbying is likely to be less pronounced.
That is, in those sectors there exist fewer non-union members (free-riders) who bene¯t from
policies brought about by the lobbying activity and, therefore, the contributions by unions
tend to be higher. Finally, notice that our measure of lobbying activity of organized labor is
relevant for all visa types, including the H1B category, since it covers both membership in
unions and professional workers associations.
We also gather data on other control variables at the industry level. The data on output,
price and (inward) foreign direct investment (FDI) is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Output represents the market value of an industry's production in current dollars, and the
base for the price index is the year 2000. FDI (in millions of current dollars) measures
the stock of foreign direct investment. The data on domestic capital (in millions of current
dollars) is a stock variable and is from the Annual Capital Expenditures Survey (ACES)
carried out by the U.S. Census Bureau. Output, prices and FDI are available for all years
between 2001 and 2005, but the capital data is not yet available for 2005. The data on
output and price are at the 6-digit input-output classi¯cation of the BEA, whereas FDI and
domestic capital follow the 1997 North American Industrial Classi¯cation System (NAICS).
Finally, to measure push factors for migrants in source countries, we develop a sector{
speci¯c measure of shocks. In particular, we use information on years in which there was
a shock in a developing country as captured by a war, earthquake, wind storm or drought.
The data on wars is from a database compiled by the Heidelberg Institute for International
Con°ict Research and the World Bank; the data on other shocks is from Ramcharan (2007).
The industry-speci¯c measure of shocks is given by a weighted average of the shocks in each
origin country, with weights equal to the share of immigrants in that industry from each
29There are 25 worker unions during the period 2001-2005 which lobby for immigration, some of them
are national and spread across all sectors (e.g. AFL-CIO and United Food and Commercial Workers) while
others are sector speci¯c (e.g. Machinists/Aerospace Workers Union). Thus it is not possible to construct a
complete industry level dataset of lobbying expenditures by unions.
18origin country.30
In order to match the CPS data with that on visas, lobbying expenditures and the
additional controls and create an industry-level dataset, we construct separate concordances
of (i) NAICS (ii) CRP and (iii) BEA input-output classi¯cations to the 1950 Census Bureau
industrial classi¯cation.31 As a result, we obtain a dataset that covers 120 3-digit industries
that follow the 1950 Census Bureau industrial classi¯cation (CPS classi¯cation).
5.3 Summary statistics
Table A1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. On
average between 2001-2005 an industry spends about $100,000 per year on immigration{
related lobbying activities (when we split equally among the various issues). If we consider
instead the total expenditures by ¯rms in a sector which lobby for immigration, on average
an industry spends about $1.1 mn per year. These values hide substantial cross{sectoral
heterogeneity as illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the top 10 industries in terms of lobbying
expenditures on immigration in the period 2001{2005. Engineering and computer services,
and Educational services are the top spenders on lobbying for immigration. In this group we
also ¯nd Hospitals, Food and related products, O±ce machines and computer manufacturing
and Agriculture. Figure 3 shows instead the top 10 sectors with the highest number of visas.
Educational services and Engineering and computer services are, not surprisingly, at the top
also of the list. Agriculture, Hospitals, Medical and other health services also appear in the
list. Thus, four industries with very high expenditures on immigration are also among those
receiving the highest number of visas.
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, it is instructive to document bivariate re-
lationships between key variables using simple scatter plots. Figure 4 suggests that there
exists a positive correlation between lobbying expenditures for immigration and the number
of visas across sectors (both variables are, in this graph, averaged over the years 2001-2005
and scaled by the number of natives in each sector). Thus, these basic scatter plots suggest
30We use data on immigrants by sector and origin country from the CPS. Immigrants are de¯ned as
foreign-born individuals.
31There is not always a one-to-one correspondence between two sectors in any two classi¯cations. In the
case where there are, for example, multiple CPS industries corresponding to a given CRP industry, the
lobbying expenditures are divided among CPS industries according to the share of natives in each CPS
industry. Next, in order to take into account the cases where one CPS industry is matched to many CRP
industries (which is often the case), the data is summed and collapsed at the CPS industry level. Similar
procedures are adopted for matching the data on output, price, FDI, domestic capital and the number of
visas to the CPS dataset.
19that sectors with larger lobbying expenditures on immigration are characterized by a higher
number of visas. The relationship between union membership rates and the number of visas
(divided by the number of natives) is instead negative, that is sectors with higher union
densities have fewer immigrants on average over the period (Figure 5). Finally, since H1B
visas represent a very important admission category and have received much attention in
the public debate, it is interesting to explore whether these correlations continue to hold for
these visas in isolation. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that this is indeed the case. Of course,
the scatter plots are only suggestive, and the purpose of the remainder of the paper is to
examine the robustness of these simple correlations.
6 Empirical analysis
Our theoretical framework shows that barriers to migration are a function of the lobbying
expenditures of the two factors of production in each industry { labor and capital. Ceteris
paribus, in sectors where labor is more politically active and therefore spends more in lobby-
ing, native workers receive more protection, that is the number of visas is smaller. However,
ceteris paribus, in sectors where capital is more active and therefore invests more in lobbying,
native workers receive less protection, that is the number of visas is larger. We assess the
theoretical predictions of the model using our rich dataset on business lobbying expenditures
and union membership rates.32
Notice that, as our focus in this paper is on sector-speci¯c aspects of U.S. migration
policy, we analyze the variation in the number of visas across sectors. We use data which is
averaged over the ¯ve years between 2001 and 2005, that is we only exploit the cross-sectional
variation. Indeed, most of the variation in the data is across sectors, rather than over time.
Based on the decomposition of the variance into between and within components, we ¯nd
that 97.4% of the variation in log(visas) is across industries.
The dependent variable of the empirical analysis is the number of visas, divided by
the number of native workers in the same sector (log(visas=native workers)). The two key
explanatory variables are the log of the industry's lobbying expenditure on migration, divided
by the number of native workers in the same sector (log(lobbying exp=native workers)) {
which measures the extent of political organization of capital { and the union membership
32Unfortunately it is not possible to carry out a structural estimation of our model as data on lobbying
activity on behalf of labor is not available by sector. See footnote 29. This forces us to use union density
as a proxy for labor lobbying activity thus making it impossible to give a structural interpretation to the
coe±cient estimates we obtain.
20rate, which equals (native union members=native workers) and measures the extent of
political organization of labor.
Notice that our key variables are scaled by the number of native workers in the same
sector.33 The reason is that we want to control for di®erences in the sizes of industries, which
might create a bias in the estimation of the coe±cients. For example, sectors that employ a
higher number of native workers tend to hire more immigrants as well and can spend larger
sums on lobbying activity. Thus, without accounting for the size of the sector, the estimate
of the impact of business lobbying expenditures would be biased upwards. The remainder
of the section presents our results.
6.1 Main results
Table 3 presents the main results of the empirical analysis and provides evidence which is
consistent with the theoretical predictions. In all tables, standard errors are robust, to ac-
count for heteroscedasticity. In regressions (1)-(2), we ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant (at the
1% level) coe±cient on log(lobbying exp=native workers), and a negative and signi¯cant (at
the 10% level) coe±cient on union membership rate. These results suggest that barriers to
migration are lower in those sectors in which business lobbies are more active, and higher
in sectors where labor unions are more important. The two key variables of the empirical
analysis explain 14% of the variation in the number of visas per native worker across sectors
(regression (2)). In fact, log(lobbying exp=native workers) alone explains 11% of the vari-
ation. The magnitude of the coe±cients (0:356 for log(lobbying exp=native workers) and
¡2:594 for union membership rate in regression (2)) implies that a 10% increase in the size
of the industry's lobbying expenditures on migration per native worker raises the number
of visas to that industry, per native worker, by 3:6%. In addition, a one-percentage-point
increase in union density { for example, moving from 10 to 11 percentage points, which
amounts to a 10% increase in the union membership rate { reduces it by 2:6%. We test
the robustness of these results in column (3) where we introduce a number of industry-level
control variables.
Although our key variables are already scaled by the number of native workers, we are still
concerned that our estimates might be driven by di®erences in the size of sectors. Therefore,
in regression (3), we control for the value of output produced in each industry. Output is a
more comprehensive measure of the size of a sector because it takes into account the impact
33To make sure that our regression results are not driven by the scaling factor, each speci¯cation includes
the log (number of native workers) as an additional control.
21of factors other than labor.
In column (3), we also introduce the industry-speci¯c unemployment rate, which is likely
to be correlated with both the demand for foreign workers in that sector and the union mem-
bership rate. The sign of the correlation between union density and the industry-speci¯c
unemployment rate is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, in sectors with higher unemploy-
ment rates, workers feel a bigger threat of being ¯red, which increases their incentive to join
unions. On the other, in sectors with higher unemployment rates, the bargaining power of
unions is lower, which implies that union densities are lower as well. Finally, the correlation
between the unemployment rate and the number of visas is a also a priori ambiguous.
Regression (3) also controls for the price of the good produced in a sector. To the extent
that a positive price shock in an industry a®ects the marginal revenue product of labor
di®erently for immigrant vs. native workers, there will be an e®ect on the labor demand for
foreign workers relative to natives. We also control for the stock of capital (both domestic
and foreign) used in each industry. To the extent that the degree of complementarity between
capital and labor is higher (lower) for immigrant vs. native workers, sectors which use more
capital should also be characterized by higher (lower) demand for foreign workers. The
results in regression (3) suggest that output, the unemployment rate, prices, domestic and
foreign capital all have an insigni¯cant e®ect on the number of visas per native worker. Most
importantly, our main ¯ndings on the key explanatory variables (log(lobbying exp=native
workers) and union membership rate) survive all the robustness checks in column (3). The
magnitude of the estimated coe±cients on lobbying expenditure and union membership rates
are only marginally a®ected by the introduction of the control variables: they remain of the
same sign and the same (or better) signi¯cance level.
As mentioned above, as a measure of migration restrictions, we use the number of visas
issued. This is an ex post measure of quotas, which might be a®ected by the supply side of
international migration °ows. In other words, the number of visas issued is an equilibrium
outcome that results from the interaction of migration policy and of those factors that a®ect
the willingness of migrants to move. The rationale for using the ex post measure is that
migration quotas are likely to be binding, for the most part, in the United States, which
implies that changes in the number of visas coincide with policy changes. For instance, it
is well known that the H1B visa quotas are regularly ¯lled within the ¯rst few days of each
¯scal year. However, to address the possibility that this assumption does not hold, we assess
the robustness of our results by including variables that a®ect the willingness of migrants to
relocate and, therefore, the number of visas if migration quotas are not binding. In column
22(3), we control for negative shocks { such as wars, earthquakes, windstorms or droughts {
taking place in the origin countries of immigrants working in any given industry (shocks).
The negative and signi¯cant coe±cient on shocks can be interpreted as being driven by the
ability of migrants to leave their origin countries. Although their willingness to migrate
may increase following a shock, their ability is likely to decrease because credit constraints
become more binding following the event. Another interpretation which is consistent with
our framework is that immigrants from countries a®ected by a shock might be entitled to
enter the US as asylum seekers or political refugees and, in that case, the number of work
visas in the sectors where those immigrants are employed will decrease. In column (3),
we also account for pull factors by including the (log) U.S. lagged wages. As expected
from a supply point of view, they have a positive and signi¯cant impact on the number
of visas issued in a given sector. In other words, sectors with higher wages attract more
immigrants. Alternatively, an interpretation related to policy is that authorities might be
more willing and better able to accommodate the requests of pro-migration lobbyists that
represent booming sectors. Regression (3) shows that our results on the key variables are
robust to the introduction of these additional regressors.
Although we have checked the robustness of our ¯ndings to the introduction of a number
of controls, we are still concerned that our estimates might be driven by endogeneity and
reverse causality. It is especially important to address endogeneity of our two key variables,
as lobbying expenditures by capital and labor are endogenous in the theoretical model itself.
In general, it is not clear ex ante how reverse causality might a®ect the estimates. On the
one hand, sectors with more migrants may already be close to their optimal levels, which
would decrease their incentive to invest in lobbying expenditures. In this case, our estimates
would be biased towards zero. On the other, sectors which receive a higher number of visas
might ¯nd it necessary to increase their lobbying activity in order to solve problems related
to the large pool of immigrants they hire (such problems might include access of immigrant
workers and their children to education, health, etc.). In this case, the estimate on lobbying
expenditures would be biased upwards, i.e. the true e®ect would be lower than the estimated
e®ect. Similarly, it is possible that sectors which receive a higher number of visas have either
higher or lower union densities. The ¯rst case might arise if a higher number of immigrants
in a sector increases the threat felt by native workers in labor markets and, therefore, their
incentive to join unions. On the other hand, in sectors with larger pools of immigrants, the
bargaining power of unions might be lower, which means that union densities will be lower
as well.
23We address reverse causality and other sources of endogeneity by using an instrumental{
variable estimation strategy. We use two instruments for log(lobbying exp=native workers).
First, we construct a measure of lobbying expenditures by ¯rms in each sector which do
not list migration as an issue in their lobbying reports. Out of a total of 12,376 ¯rms in
the lobbying dataset, the majority (96 percent) does not list immigration as an issue. We
assume that these ¯rms' lobbying expenditures on issues other than immigration do not a®ect
migration directly (exclusion restriction). At the same time, it is likely that industry-level
factors a®ect lobbying expenditures of all ¯rms in a given sector, no matter what policy issues
¯rms are interested in. For example, according to the political economy literature of trade
policy, lobbying activity is in general determined by factors like the number of ¯rms, their
size distribution, geographic concentration, etc. within a sector Tre°er (1993). Therefore,
we expect our instrument to be correlated with the lobbying expenditures on migration (¯rst
stage).
As an additional instrument for lobbying expenditures on migration, we use a variable
that measures the concentration of ¯rms in a sector. In doing so, we follow the trade literature
which uses traditional political economy variables to instrument for campaign contributions
(Goldberg and Maggi 1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). In particular, our
measure of concentration is the variance of ¯rm size (proxied by annual payroll) within
a sector. The idea is that the more concentrated a sector is (the higher the variance in
¯rms' size), the easier it is for ¯rms in that industry to overcome the collective action
problem in forming a lobby, thus the larger are the lobbying expenditures (Olson 1965). The
data on annual payroll of ¯rms is obtained from the US Census, County Business Patterns
(http//www.census.gov/csd/susb/defterm.html).
Next, our instrument for the union membership rate uses data from the United King-
dom on union densities across industries. According to the literature, sector-speci¯c union
membership rates are positively correlated across a wide set of industrialized countries (see
Riley 1997, Blanch°ower 2007) (¯rst stage). Industries which exhibit a high level of work
standardization and a clear distinction between managerial and operative tasks are more
likely to be unionized, the reason being that these working conditions lead to intra-group
homogeneity as well as distinct group boundaries. In addition, it is plausible to assume that
UK union membership rates do not directly a®ect the number of visas in the U.S. (exclusion
restriction).
The high values of the two ¯rst-stage F statistics for the excluded instruments at the end
of Table 4a suggest that the instruments are strong. In regression (1), in the ¯rst stage of
24log(lobbying exp=native workers), the F value of the excluded instruments is equal to 62.66;
in the ¯rst stage of union membership rate, the F value of the excluded instruments is
equal to 40.61. In Table 4b, the ¯rst stage regressions suggest that lobbying expenditures on
immigration are positively and signi¯cantly correlated with lobbying expenditures on other
issues and with the degree of concentration in the sector.34 In addition, union membership
rates in the US are positively and signi¯cantly correlated with the corresponding rates in the
UK. The Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions is satis¯ed at the 1 percent signi¯cance
level (i.e., we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the estimated
residuals and the excluded instruments). In addition, and most importantly, the results in
Table 4a from the IV regressions, with and without controls, con¯rm that the number of
visas per native worker is higher in sectors where business lobbies are more active, and lower
in sectors where labor unions are more important. The magnitude of the coe±cients on
both lobbying expenditures and union membership rates increases relative to Table 3. The
di®erence in the magnitudes might be driven by a negative correlation between lobbying
expenditures on migration and the unobserved component of the number of visas35 and by
a positive correlation between union membership rates and the unobserved component of
the number of visas36 However, the di®erence between the magnitudes of the IV and OLS
estimates could also be explained by measurement error in the key explanatory variables
leading to attenuation bias in the OLS estimates.
To the extent that we do not have a clean natural experiment to identify the e®ects of
lobbying activity on migration restrictions, the instrumental variables' estimates should be
interpreted with due caution. For example, it might be the case that lobbying expenditures
on policy issues other than immigration draw resources and policymakers' attention away
from migration policy and, thus, directly in°uence (reduce) the number of visas in a given
sector. However, in that case, the IV estimate would be biased towards zero and, hence,
represent a lower bound of the true e®ect. Furthermore, as an additional robustness check of
the IV results we use an alternative measure of lobbying activity by pro{migration business
groups as the explanatory variable, i.e. the number of ¯rms in each sector that list migration
as an issue. Using the same instruments as before, we obtain qualitatively similar results,
34In Table 4b, columns (1)-(2), log (lobbying exp on other issues/native workers) is highly signi¯cant.
On the other hand, log (variance of ¯rm size) is only jointly signi¯cant with log (lobbying exp on other
issues/native workers). The p-value for the F-test of joint signi¯cance (not shown) is equal to 0.00.
35I.e., sectors with a higher number of visas contribute less, possibly because they are closer to their ideal
number of immigrants.
36I.e., in sectors with a higher number of visas, natives feel a stronger threat, which increases their incentive
to join unions.
25which are available upon request.
To summarize, our estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the size of lobbying expen-
ditures by business groups, per native worker, is associated with a 2.9 { 4.4 percent larger
number of visas per native worker, while a one-percentage point increase in the union mem-
bership rate is associated with a 2.6 { 5.5 percent lower number of visas per native worker.
The results are robust to introducing a number of industry-level control variables and to
addressing endogeneity issues with an instrumental variable strategy.
6.2 Additional results
We next investigate how our previous results change when we consider alternative measures
of migration restrictions (Table 5). In column (1), we exclude the number of J1 visas from
the de¯nition of the dependent variable, as it might be argued that students should not be
part of the analysis (J1 visas are given to both temporary lecturers/visiting professors and
students). In regression (2), we further restrict the de¯nition of the dependent variable by
considering only visas with quotas. Finally, in regression (3), the dependent variable we use
is the (log) number of H1B visas approved. Our estimates in Table 5 are indeed remarkably
similar to what we previously found in Table 3, and show that the results are robust to using
alternative de¯nitions of migration restrictions. The estimates in regression (3) suggest that
sectors with 10% higher lobbying expenditures by business groups per native worker are
associated with a 1:8% larger number of H1B visas approved, per native worker; in addition,
a one percentage point increase in the union membership rate is associated with a 3:6% lower
number of H1B visas per native worker.
In Table 6, we use an alternative measure of lobbying expenditures on immigration.
As discussed above, in Table 3 log(lobbying exp=native workers) is calculated by dividing
the total expenditure of a ¯rm { that lists migration as an issue { by the total number of
issues listed in the lobbying report; ¯nally, ¯rm expenditures are summed for each sector.
In Table 6, instead, we consider ¯rms which list \immigration" as an issue in their reports
and take their total lobbying expenditures (as opposed to splitting them). This variable
thus represents an upper bound of the true lobbying expenditures on immigration. Using
this alternative measure, we ¯nd that the estimated impact of lobbying expenditures is very
similar and not statistically di®erent from the basic estimates in Table 3.
In Table 7, we explore whether we would have obtained similar results using an alter-
native measure of political organization of capital, namely campaign contributions from
Political Action Committees (PAC). Data on PAC campaign contributions has been used
26extensively in the international economics literature, but does not allow researchers to dis-
entangle the di®erent purposes for which a contribution is made (see for example, Goldberg
and Maggi 1999, and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). When we use this proxy for the
political organization of capital, we ¯nd the estimates of the coe±cient on log(campaign
contributions=native workers) to be either not signi¯cant or marginally signi¯cant at con-
ventional levels (see ¯rst two columns in Table 7). The data on PAC campaign contributions
is compiled by two-year election cycles. We average PAC contributions data over the 2001-
02 and 2003-04 election cycles. In regressions (3)-(4), for comparison purposes, we look at
the impact of log(lobbying exp=native workers) using data on lobbying expenditures which
is averaged over the same years (2001-2004). The coe±cient on log(lobbying exp=native
workers) is very similar to what we found in Table 3. In addition, the last two columns
in Table 7 { where we introduce both measures of political organization of capital { clearly
show that it is lobbying expenditures on migration, rather than PAC campaign contribu-
tions, that positively a®ect the number of visas. The results are striking and cast doubt
on the use of PAC campaign contributions data as an appropriate indicator to examine the
e®ect of lobbying on policy outcomes.
6.3 Robustness checks
We con¯rm the ¯ndings in Table 3 in a series of robustness checks reported in the Appendix.
We estimate the same speci¯cations as in Table 3: dropping agriculture from the sample,
which is a sector employing large numbers of illegal immigrants (columns (1)-(2), Table A6);
using pooled { as opposed to averaged { data (including year ¯xed e®ects) (columns (3)-
(4), Table A6); constraining observations in the sample to be the same across regressions
(columns (5)-(6), Table A6); including observations corresponding to sectors with zero lob-
bying expenditures (columns (7)-(8), Table A6).37 Our results in these robustness checks are
very similar to what we found in Table 3.38
Furthermore, we carry out the analysis also splitting the sectors between skilled{intensive
and unskilled{intensive ones. We ¯nd evidence that the magnitude in absolute value of the
coe±cients on log(lobbyingexp/native workers) and union membership rates are larger for
the skilled{intensive sectors relative to the unskilled{intensive ones. However, the two sets
37The log speci¯cation in Table 3 drops the sectors with zero contributions. In Table A6, the zero lobbying
expenditures are replaced by the minimum positive value of lobbying expenditures in the sample.
38In addition the data best ¯ts a log speci¯cation (as opposed to one in levels). Also, there is no evidence of
non-linear e®ects in log(lobbying exp=native workers) and union membership rate (results available upon
request).
27of coe±cients are not signi¯cantly di®erent (results available upon request). To conclude,
the results are also robust when we control for the capital/labor ratio and skilled/unskilled
labor ratio in each sector (see columns (1)-(2), Table A7).
7 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the ¯rst study that attempts to provide
systematic empirical evidence on the political-economy determinants of current US immigra-
tion policy, focusing in particular on the role played by interest groups. To this end, we have
started our analysis developing a simple theoretical framework that links migration to the
intensity of the lobbying activities carried out by pro and anti{immigration pressure groups.
Next, we have constructed an industry-level dataset on lobbying expenditures by organized
groups, combining it with information on the number of visas issued and on union mem-
bership rates. The analysis provides strong evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration
interest groups play a statistically signi¯cant and economically relevant role in shaping mi-
gration across sectors. Barriers to migration are higher in sectors where labor unions are
more important, and lower in those sectors in which business lobbies are more active. The
estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the size of lobbying expenditures by business groups,
is associated with a 2.9 { 4.4 percent larger number of visas, while a one-percentage point
increase in the union membership rate (assumed to be a proxy for lobbying expenditures
by labor groups) is associated with a 2.6 { 5.5 percent lower number of visas. The results
are robust to introducing a number of industry-level control variables and to using an in-
strumental variable strategy to address the endogeneity of lobbying expenditures and union
membership rates.
It is di±cult to provide a precise account of all the channels through which U.S. immi-
gration policy works. In particular, the e®ects we estimate can be result of the use of a
variety of policy tools. Besides the quantitative restrictions applied to speci¯c visa types,
several regulations substantially a®ect the number of visas issued and their allocation across
sectors. In particular, in addition to \visible" restrictions { like quotas { which clearly have
a fundamental impact, the government can use a number of other instruments to manage
access to the labor market in speci¯c sectors. An example of \invisible" barrier that acts as a
form of protectionism is the set of rules that regulate the entry of foreign medical doctors in
the US healthcare system. Indeed, even foreign doctors trained at top international medical
schools are not allowed to practice the medical profession in the US unless they complete
28their residency in a US hospital, a requirement that involves spending several years in a low{
paying job. Another example of \invisible barrier" is represented by the complex procedures
that have to be followed by an employer to hire a temporary (often seasonal) agricultural
worker under the H2A program. These procedures are similar to those described for the
H1B visas in section 3 and require the employer to advertise widely the job, show that the
worker will earn at least the Adverse E®ect Wage Rate39 etc. The `costs' associated to this
process represent a large burden and have resulted in an under{utilization of the program.
In addition interest groups can carry out their lobbying activity on both \visible" and
\invisible" restrictions, approaching o±cials at di®erent level of policy making. For instance,
for a \statutory change" like increasing a visa cap, interest groups will lobby Congress.
This was the case for the increase in the number of H1B visas which was approved by
the US Congress in 1998 as part of the broader Omnibus Appropriations Bill (HR 4328).
Similarly, agricultural interests played an important role in shaping the HR 371 Bill recently
introduced by Congressman Berman to \improve the agricultural job opportunities, bene¯ts,
and security for aliens in the United States." For a \regulatory change" instead, like labor
certi¯cation or the H2A speci¯c wage rate, interest groups lobby an agency in the executive
branch such as the Department of Labor.40
To conclude, the empirical results suggest that, independently from the channels through
which these e®ects work, policymakers target a given allocation of immigrants across sectors.
Moreover, political-economy forces play a quantitatively important role in determining the
cross-sectoral allocation of immigrants.
Further empirical work could explore other sources of data to analyze the variation in
alternative measures of immigration policy { legal vs illegal, temporary vs permanent, etc.
In addition, the paper could also be extended to examine the variation in immigration policy
outcomes along occupation and geographical dimensions (for example, across U.S. states).
Finally, ¯rm-level data on lobbying expenditures can be exploited to study the importance
of political-economy forces in the determination of policies other than immigration { e.g.
trade, environment, taxes etc.
39Adverse e®ect wage rates are the minimum wage rates which the Department of Labor has determined
must be o®ered and paid to U.S. and foreign workers by employers of nonimmigrant foreign agricultural
workers (H2-A visa holders). Such employers must pay the higher of the AEWR, the applicable prevailing
wage, or the statutory minimum wage as speci¯ed in the regulations 20 CFR 655.107.
40We would like to thank Julia Massimino of the sta® of Congressman Berman, for sharing with us this
and other very useful information on the working of US immigration policy.
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8 Appendix
Consider a small open economy consisting of n + 1 sectors, populated by a unit mass of
individuals. The output of sector zero is the numeraire and is produced using sector-speci¯c
labor according to an identity production function, i.e. X0 = L0. The output of all other
sectors is produced using sector-speci¯c labor, which we assume to be internationally mo-
bile.41 The production technology in each non-numeraire sector exhibits diminishing returns
41There is substantial evidence supporting this view. For instance Friedberg (2001), among others, ¯nds
a signi¯cant positive relationship between source and destination country sector employment for Russian
immigrants to Israel in the nineties. See also Kambourov and Manovskii (2008).
33to labor, and we denote by !i the domestic return to labor in sector i. As usual, diminishing
returns can be attributed to the presence of a ¯xed factor in each sector (?). We will call this
factor capital and denote the overall reward to the speci¯c ¯xed factor employed in sector i
by ¼i.
For simplicity, we assume that free trade in goods prevails and we normalize the inter-
national price for each commodity, setting it equal to one.42 In addition, we assume that
the country faces an in¯nitely elastic foreign labor supply curve and that the return in the
international market to each type of labor is also equal to one. Any di®erence between
the domestic factor return !i and the international return will be explained by the policies
implemented by the domestic government.
Consumers are characterized by a separable, quasi{linear utility function that takes the
following form:




An individual maximizing this utility given an income I will have a demand di(pi) for
each non-numeraire good, while the demand for the numeraire good is given by d0 = I ¡
Pn







i[ui(di(pi)) ¡ pidi(pi)] is the consumer surplus. Notice
that, by assuming a small open economy that trades freely in ¯nal goods, the consumer
surplus of each agent is not going to be a®ected by changes in factor returns brought about
by government policies (i.e., changes in factor returns do not a®ect goods' prices).
Let `i denote the total domestic supply of labor of type i, i 2 f0;1;:::ng available in the
economy, while Li(!i) is the demand for this factor. Restrictions43 to the physical relocation
of people across countries often take the form of a (binding) quota, accompanied by a tax (i.e.,
a di®erential ¯scal treatment for immigrants vis a vis natives44), resulting in the immigrant
retaining only part of the surplus associated with the relocation (i.e., the di®erence between
42This implies that we are abstracting from the potential price e®ects of immigration. To the best of our
knowledge, the only empirical paper on this issue is Cortes (2006), which uses highly disaggregated US data
at the city level. Her ¯ndings suggest that { across US cities, the average decrease in the cost of living due
to immigration in the nineties is fairly small.
43Of course, policies could also be used to promote immigration. This has been for instance the case in
many labor{scarce economies in the nineteenth century like Brazil and Argentina, as Timmer and Williamson
(1996) have pointed out. Within the framework of the model, policies of this type would take the form of
immigration subsidies. For simplicity we will not model this type of instruments explicitly as in the recent
U.S. experience they have hardly been used.
44The US tax code for instance con¯gures a di®erential treatment between residents and non residents.
34the wage prevailing in the country of destination and the country of origin). As a result, the





°i(!i(qi) ¡ 1)(Li(!i(qi)) ¡ `i) (2)
where !i(qi) is the wage that prevails in the Host country as a result of the introduction
of a binding quota, and Li(!i(qi)) is the corresponding employment level. The parameter
°i 2 [0;1] represents instead the share of the rent associated with the immigration quota
that is captured by the government of the receiving country, while (1 ¡°i) is the fraction of
the wage premium (!i(qi) ¡ 1) associated with migration that is retained by the relocating
migrant.
The ¯scal revenues associated with the quota cum tax introduced by the government
are lump sum rebated to all citizens of the country we are considering. Each domestic
citizen supplies one unit of labor speci¯c to the numeraire sector and at most one unit of a
factor (capital or labor) speci¯c to any non-numeraire sector. Since the size of the domestic
population is normalized to one, the welfare of the agents supplying labor in sector i is equal
to




where the ¯rst term is the return to sector i speci¯c labor, ®iL is the share of the population
that owns labor used in the production of output i and, ¯nally, 1 is the return to labor in
the numeraire sector. The welfare of agents supplying the ¯xed factor (capital) is instead
given by




where ¼i(qi) is the return to capital in sector i and ®iK is the share of the population that
owns sector i speci¯c capital. The ¯rst best policy in this model is obtained by maximizing




(ViK + ViL) (5)
and, as can be easily shown, this involves free labor mobility. Intuitively, starting from
a scenario with less than free labor mobility, immigration reduces wages, but the loss to
35domestic workers is less than the gains to domestic capital owners (see Borjas 1995 for a
graphical exposition). Hence, it is optimal to admit all foreign workers willing to relocate to
the country and that domestic ¯rms are willing to hire. In other words, the ¯rst-best quota
q¤
i set by the government is such that
q
¤
i ¸ mi(1;pi) = Li(1;pi) ¡ `i (6)
If we bring in directly the quantities of the speci¯c factors in the production structure and
let ki be the amount of speci¯c ¯xed factor employed in sector i, the ¯rst best number
of migrants mi(1;ki;pi) is ceteris paribus an increasing function of the stock of capital ki
available in sector i. Similarly, an increase in the relative price of the good produced in
sector i leads to an increase in the ¯rst best number of migrants in the sector. In both cases,
the increase in the number of migrants is brought about by an outward shift in the labor
demand curve in the sector.
Inspired by the pioneering contributions of Findlay and Wellisz (1982), we model mea-
sures towards labor mobility in each sector as the result of expenditures by a pro{migration
lobby (made up by capital owners) and by an anti{migration lobby (made up by workers). In
particular, we will carry out our analysis assuming that !i(qi)¡1 = ¸(EiL)2¡(1¡¸)(EiK)2,
where ¸ represents the weight of labor in the protection function and (1 ¡ ¸) the weight of
capital. Notice that the protection function is increasing in the expenditures of organized
workers and decreasing with the expenditures undertaken by the owners of capital. Further-
more, we assume increasing returns to lobbying, to re°ect the real world observation that
larger donors command disproportionately greater in°uence (Eicher and Osang 2002). The
two lobby then play a non-cooperative game where they choose the amount to pay in order
to maximize their net welfare, given by
­iK(qi) = ViK(qi) ¡ EiK
­iL(qi) = ViL(qi) ¡ EiL





















To interpret equations (7) and (8), notice that the ¯rst term on the left hand side { in
brackets { represents the impact of a change in the return to labor on the welfare of the
lobby, and the product of the second and third terms represents the marginal e®ect of one
dollar of expenditure on the return to labor. Thus, the left hand side equals the marginal
bene¯t brought about to the lobby by a dollar of expenditure, and that has to be equal to
the marginal cost { equal to 1 { on the right hand side. Assume that the domestic labor
demand is linear, i.e. that it takes the form
Li = L ¡ b!i (9)
and that, for simplicity, the ownership of capital in the population is highly concentrated
(®iK = 0 for all i).46 Solving simultaneously the system of equations given by (7) and (8),





















Thus, ceteris paribus, sectors in which unions are more active and spend larger amounts
have higher protection (i.e., smaller quotas) granted to domestic labor, while sectors where
capital's expenditures are higher will have less restrictive migration policies, i.e. larger
quotas.
How likely is it that the observed number of migrants is the result of the working of the
political-economy forces we have modeled? In other words, could it be the case that the
actual number of migrants is the result of shocks occurring on the supply side of migration,
rather than of the policy actually implemented by the Host country? To answer this question,
45Assuming impartial rent capturing, i.e. °i < 1, complicates the algebra without changing the main
result. For an analysis that includes imperfect capturing, see Facchini and Willmann (2005) and Facchini
and Testa (2008).
46Formally, we are assuming that the production function in each sector takes the form yi = L
b Li ¡ 1
2bL2
i,






37consider the possibility that, after a restrictive quota has been introduced, a supply shock
occurs in the international market, that increases the wage prevailing in the rest of the
world from 1 to w0 (Figure A1). This could be, for example, the result of a technological
improvement in the source country that lifts the average wage individuals can earn by staying
put. Better opportunities in the rest of the world imply that the potential migrant will need
to re{evaluate his decision to relocate. In particular, in our simple model, he will be moving
only if the wage he can earn in the destination country is higher or equal to the wage he can
secure in the rest of the world. Thus, as a result of the upward shift in the international labor
supply (from LS
w to LS0
w ) two possible scenarios can arise. They are illustrated in panels (a)
and (b) of Figure A1 where Ld and lS are, respectively, the labor demand and the domestic
labor supply in the destination country, and q is the quota set by the government.
Panel (a) describes the case in which the original quota set by the Host country continues
to be binding after the shock. In this situation, the wage wq determined by the quota is
still above the wage prevailing in the rest of the world after the shock, and the number
of migrants e®ectively admitted to the Host country continues to be determined by the
Host country's restrictive policy. In panel (b) instead, the shock to the international factor
price is substantial and the wage prevailing in the international market is above wq, the
quota determined wage. As a result, the quota is no longer binding: In that case, migrants
are willing to relocate to the host country only if the equilibrium wage prevailing in the
destination country raises to !0. If that is the case, the number of migrants actually willing
to relocate to the Host country will be lower than the one set by the quota and equal to
Ld(!0) ¡ `S. In this case, the political economy forces no longer play a role in shaping
the volume of migrants, which is instead purely determined by market forces, i.e. by the
intersection between domestic labor demand and international labor supply. Therefore, it is
important to point out that, for the supply side considerations to play a role in shaping the
equilibrium outcome in this simple model, a very large shock must occur, that makes the
policy choice of the host government irrelevant.
38Notes. The data on campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures are averaged over three election cycles -- 1999-
2000, 2001-02 and 2003-04. The correlation between (log) contributions from PACs and (log) overall lobbying 
expenditures (top panel) is 0.328 (robust standard error=0.099; p-value=0.000); the correlation between (log) 
contributions from PACs and (log) lobbying expenditures for immigration is 0.074 (robust standard error=0.132; p-
value=0.580).
(in millions of US$)
Figure 1. Scatter Plots between Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions from 
Political Action Committees (PACs)
(in millions of US$)
Campaign contributions from PACs and overall lobbying expenditures
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sNotes. All data are averaged over 2001-2005. The correlation between (log) lobbying expenditures for immigration and (log) number of 
visas  (top panel) is 0.316 (robust standard error=0.080; p-value=0.000); the correlation between union membership rates and (log)  
number of visas is -2.283 (robust standard error=1.220; p-value=0.063).
Figure 4. Scatter Plot - Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of Visas
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Union membership rates
(mean) lgvisas_all Fitted valuesNotes. All data are averaged over 2001-2005. The correlation between (log) lobbying expenditures for immigration and (log) 
number of H1B visas  (top panel) is 0.255 (robust standard error=0.068; p-value=0.001); the correlation between union 
membership rates and (log) number of H1B visas is -2.180 (robust standard error=1.161; p-value=0.062).
Figure 6. Scatter Plot - Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of H1B Visas
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Union membership rates
(mean) lgh1b Fitted valuesFigure A1. The Effects of a Migration QuotaElection cycle 1999-2000 2001-02 2003-04
Contributions from PACs 326 348 461
Overall lobbying exp 2949 3330 4048
Total targeted political activity 3275 3678 4509
Source. Center for Responsive Politics
Table 2. Targeted Political Activity
(in millions of US dollars)Dependent variable     log (visas/native workers)
[1] [2] [3]
log (lobbying exp/native workers) 0.316*** 0.356*** 0.294***
[0.076] [0.080] [0.084]














log (lag US wages) 10.318***
[3.329]
log (number of native workers) 0.077
[0.237]
N 126 126 120
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.27
 
All data are averaged over 2001-2005. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, and denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent respectively.
Table 3. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, OLS Dependent variable log ( visas/native workers)
[1] [2]
log (lobbying exp/native workers) 0.439*** 0.325**
[0.126] [0.124]














log (lag US wages) 10.617**
[4.268]
log (number of native workers) 0.104
[0.270]
First-stage F for log(lobbying exp/nat workers) 62.66 47.22
First-stage F for union membership 40.61 16.38
Hansen's J-statistic (p-value) 0.97 0.73
N 109 106
R-squared 0.11 0.24
Table 4a. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration,
 Instrumental Variables
Lobbying expenditures on issues other than immigration, variance of firm size and union membership rates in 
the UK are used as instruments for the two endogenous variables -- lobbying expenditures and union 
membership rates. All data are averaged over 2001-2005.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.Dependent variable
[1] [2] [3] [4]
log (lobbying exp on other issues/native workers) 1.017*** 1.036*** -0.002 0.001
[0.077] [0.090] [0.007] [0.005]
log (variance of firm size) 0.098 0.077 0.007 0.001
[0.059] [0.057] [0.005] [0.006]
union membership rate in the UK -1.620* -1.314* 0.514*** 0.459***
[0.853] [0.790] [0.104] [0.106]
lg (output) -0.05 -0.018
[0.162] [0.011]
unemployment rate -2.513 -0.361
[4.151] [0.258]
log (price) -1.002 -0.004
[1.144] [0.169]
log (capital) -0.026 0.013
[0.141] [0.010]




log (lag US wages) 1.047 0.289*
[3.235] [0.173]
log (number of native workers) 0.099 -0.002
[0.146] [0.011]
N 109 106 122 118
R-squared 0.69 0.72 0.53 0.56
This table shows the first stage regression corresponding to Table 4a. All data are averaged over 2001-2005.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
Table 4b. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration,
 Instrumental Variables -- First Stage
log (lobbying exp/native workers) union membership rate in the USDependent variable     log (visas/native workers)
Visas excluding J1 Visas with quota H1B visas
[1] [2] [3]
log (lobbying exp/native workers) 0.287*** 0.253*** 0.182***
[0.082] [0.080] [0.065]
union membership rate -3.516** -3.299** -3.623***
[1.350] [1.376] [1.292]
lg (output) 0.016 0.032 -0.114
[0.205] [0.197] [0.181]
unemployment rate 7.535 6.884 1.661
[5.715] [5.774] [4.323]
log (price) 1.255 0.615 1.112
[2.313] [2.279] [2.165]
log (capital) -0.209 -0.233 0.009
[0.225] [0.217] [0.151]
log (FDI) 0.05 0.082 0.107
[0.090] [0.071] [0.066]
shocks -6.589** -5.389** -4.892**
[2.748] [2.594] [2.444]
log (lag US wages) 10.265*** 10.193*** 9.834***
[3.295] [3.173] [2.951]
log (number of native workers) 0.02 -0.048 -0.169
[0.209] [0.206] [0.198]
N 120 120 120
R-squared 0.29 0.31 0.34
 
All data are averaged over 2001-2005. Standard errors are are corrected for heteroskedasticity and denoted in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
Table 5. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, 
Alternative Dependent VariablesDependent variable log (visas/native workers)
[1] [2]
log (lobbying exp_upper bound/native workers) 0.321*** 0.252***
[0.082] [0.085]














log (lag US wages) 11.124***
[3.343]





Table 6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration
Alternative Measure of Lobbying Expenditures
lobbying exp_upper bound represents the total lobbying expenditures by  firms within a sector which list 
immigration as an issue. All data are averaged over 2001-2005. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, and denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively.Dependent variable
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
log (PAC contribution / native workers) 0.208* -0.131 0.163 -0.312
[0.119] [0.150] [0.129] [0.249]
log (lobbying exp/native workers) 0.326*** 0.243*** 0.305*** 0.237***
[0.068] [0.080] [0.069] [0.079]
union membership rate -1.801* -3.102** -3.516** -3.999*** -3.149** -4.068***
[1.056] [1.319] [1.426] [1.512] [1.359] [1.485]
lg (output) -0.117 -0.06 -0.127
[0.181] [0.225] [0.222]
unemployment rate 6.372 8.319 7.751
[5.160] [5.492] [5.515]
log (price) -1.288 0.711 -0.401
[2.565] [2.580] [2.515]
log (capital) -0.076 -0.122 -0.104
[0.205] [0.213] [0.219]
log (FDI) 0.174** 0.073 0.147**
[0.076] [0.087] [0.073]
shocks -4.262** -5.663** -4.801**
[2.091] [2.397] [2.355]
log (lag US wages) 10.126*** 9.098*** 8.718***
[3.112] [3.247] [3.177]
log (number of native workers) -0.204 0.031 -0.287
[0.226] [0.245] [0.295]
N 133 127 119 113 118 112
R-squared 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.28 0.18 0.32
 
Table 7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration,
Campaign Contributions from PAC vs Lobbying Expenditures
Standard errors are are corrected for heteroskedasticity and denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
PACs stand for political action committees. The contirbutions by PACs is averaged over election cycles 2001-02 and 2003-04. For comparison, data on 
lobbying expenditures is averaged over the same period.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 ACC   Accounting 
 ADV   Advertising 
 AER   Aerospace 
 AGR   Agriculture 
 ALC   Alcohol & Drug Abuse 
 ANI   Animals 
 APP   Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles 
 ART   Arts/Entertainment 
 AUT   Automotive Industry 
 AVI   Aviation/Aircraft/ Airlines 
 BAN   Banking 
 BNK   Bankruptcy 
 BEV   Beverage Industry 
 BUD   Budget/Appropriations 
 CHM   Chemicals/Chemical Industry 
 CIV   Civil Rights/Civil Liberties 
 CAW   Clean Air & Water (Quality) 
 CDT   Commodities (Big Ticket) 
 COM   Communications/ Broadcasting/ Radio/TV 
 CPI   Computer Industry 
 CSP   Consumer Issues/Safety/ Protection 
 CON   Constitution 
 CPT   Copyright/Patent/ Trademark 
 DEF   Defense 
 DOC   District of Columbia 
 DIS   Disaster Planning/Emergencies 
 ECN   Economics/Economic Development 
 EDU   Education 
 ENG   Energy/Nuclear 
 ENV   Environmental/Superfund 
 FAM   Family Issues/Abortion/ Adoption 
 FIR   Firearms/Guns/ Ammunition 
 FIN   Financial Institutions/Investments/ Securities 
 FOO   Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.) 
 FOR   Foreign Relations 
 FUE   Fuel/Gas/Oil 
 GAM   Gaming/Gambling/ Casino 
 GOV   Government Issues 
 HCR   Health Issues 
 HOU   Housing 
 IMM   Immigration 
 IND   Indian/Native American Affairs 
 INS   Insurance 
 LBR   Labor Issues/Antitrust/ Workplace 
 LAW   Law Enforcement/Crime/ Criminal Justice 
 MAN   Manufacturing 
 MAR   Marine/Maritime/ Boating/Fisheries 
 MIA   Media (Information/ Publishing) 
 MED   Medical/Disease Research/ Clinical Labs 
 MMM   Medicare/Medicaid 
 MON   Minting/Money/ Gold Standard 
 NAT   Natural Resources 
 PHA   Pharmacy 
 POS   Postal 
 RRR   Railroads 
 RES   Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation 
 REL   Religion 
 RET   Retirement 
 ROD   Roads/Highway 
 SCI   Science/Technology 
 SMB   Small Business 
 SPO   Sports/Athletics 
 TAX   Taxation/Internal Revenue Code 
 TEC   Telecommunications 
 TOB   Tobacco 
 TOR   Torts 
 TRD   Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 
 TRA   Transportation 
 TOU   Travel/Tourism 
 TRU   Trucking/Shipping 
 URB   Urban Development/ Municipalities 
 UNM   Unemployment 
 UTI   Utilities 
 VET   Veterans 
 WAS   Waste (hazardous/ solid/ interstate/ nuclear) 
 WEL   Welfare 
Source: Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR)
 Table A2. List of IssuesTable A3. Sample Lobbying Report - Morrison Public Affairs GroupTable A4. Sample Lobbying Report - Microsoft CorporationSource. Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR)CPS Industry Code CPS Industry Name CPS Industry Code CPS Industry Name
105   Agriculture 567   Petroleum and gasoline pipe lines
116   Forestry 568   Services incidental to transportation
126   Fisheries 578   Telephone
206   Metal mining 579   Telegraph
216   Coal mining 586   Electric light and power
226   Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction 587   Gas and steam supply systems
236   Nonmetallic mining and quarrying, except fuel 588   Electric-gas utilities
246   Construction 596   Water supply
306   Logging 597   Sanitary services
307   Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork 598   Other and not specified utilities
308   Misc wood products 606   Motor vehicles and equipment
309   Furniture and fixtures 607   Drugs, chemicals, and allied products
316   Glass and glass products 608   Dry goods apparel
317   Cement, concrete, gypsum and plaster products 609   Food and related products
318   Structural clay products 616   Electrical goods, hardware, and plumbing equipment
319   Pottery and related products 617   Machinery, equipment, and supplies
326   Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral and stone products 618   Petroleum products
336   Blast furnaces, steel works, & rolling mills 619   Farm products--raw materials
337   Other primary iron and steel industries 626   Miscellaneous wholesale trade
338   Primary nonferrous industries 627   Not specified wholesale trade
346   Fabricated steel products 636   Food stores, except dairy products
347   Fabricated nonferrous metal products 637   Dairy products stores and milk retailing
348   Not specified metal industries 646   General merchandise stores
356   Agricultural machinery and tractors 647   Five and ten cent stores
357   Office and store machines and devices 656   Apparel and accessories stores, except shoe
358   Miscellaneous machinery 657   Shoe stores
367   Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies 658   Furniture and house furnishing stores
376   Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 659   Household appliance and radio stores
377   Aircraft and parts 667   Motor vehicles and accessories retailing
378   Ship and boat building and repairing 668   Gasoline service stations
379   Railroad and miscellaneous transportation equipmen 669   Drug stores
386   Professional equipment and supplies 679   Eating and drinking places
387   Photographic equipment and supplies 686   Hardware and farm implement stores
388   Watches, clocks, and clockwork-operated devices 687   Lumber and building material retailing
399   Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 688   Liquor stores
406   Meat products 689   Retail florists
407   Dairy products 696   Jewelry stores
408   Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and seafoods 697   Fuel and ice retailing
409   Grain-mill products 698   Miscellaneous retail stores
416   Bakery products 699   Not specified retail trade
417   Confectionery and related products 716   Banking and credit agencies
418   Beverage industries 726   Security and commodity brokerage and investment companies
419   Miscellaneous food preparations and kindred products 736   Insurance
426   Not specified food industries 746   Real estate
429   Tobacco manufactures 806   Advertising
436   Knitting mills 807   Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
437   Dyeing and finishing textiles, except knit goods 808   Miscellaneous business services
438   Carpets, rugs, and other floor coverings 816   Auto repair services and garages
439   Yarn, thread, and fabric mills 817   Miscellaneous repair services
446   Miscellaneous textile mill products 826   Private households
448   Apparel and accessories 836   Hotels and lodging places
449   Miscellaneous fabricated textile products 846   Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services
456   Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 847   Dressmaking shops
457   Paperboard containers and boxes 848   Shoe repair shops
458   Miscellaneous paper and pulp products 849   Miscellaneous personal services
459   Printing, publishing, and allied industries 856   Radio broadcasting and television
466   Synthetic fibers 857   Theaters and motion pictures
467   Drugs and medicines 858   Bowling alleys, and billiard and pool parlors
468   Paints, varnishes, and related products 859   Miscellaneous entertainment and recreation services
469   Miscellaneous chemicals and allied products 868   Medical and other health services, except hospitals
476   Petroleum refining 869   Hospitals
477   Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 879   Legal services
478   Rubber products 888   Educational services
487   Leather: tanned, curried, and finished 896   Welfare and religious services
488   Footwear, except rubber 897   Nonprofit membership organizations
489   Leather products, except footwear 898   Engineering and architectural services
499   Not specified manufacturing industries 899   Miscellaneous professional and related services
506   Railroads and railway express service 906   Postal service
516   Street railways and bus lines 916   Federal public administration
526   Trucking service 926   State public administration
527   Warehousing and storage 936   Local public administration
536   Taxicab service
546   Water transportation
556   Air transportation
Table A5. List of CPS Industries (Census Bureau classification)
Source. Cenus Population Survey (www.ipums.org)Dependent variable
Balanced observations Zero lobbying exp. included
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
log (lobbying exp/native workers) 0.347*** 0.272*** 0.337*** 0.282*** 0.339*** 0.294*** 0.163*** 0.137**
[0.080] [0.082] [0.044] [0.054] [0.079] [0.084] [0.055] [0.055]
union membership rate -2.419* -3.059** -2.116*** -1.941** -2.112 -3.232** -2.493** -2.952**
[1.432] [1.439] [0.793] [0.903] [1.366] [1.455] [1.121] [1.195]
lg (output) -0.05 -0.193 -0.012 -0.044
[0.213] [0.162] [0.216] [0.170]
unemployment rate 6.654 3.123 7.305 6.215
[5.679] [3.264] [5.832] [5.302]
log (price) 1.134 3.290** 1.582 0.85
[2.385] [1.401] [2.416] [2.412]
log (capital) -0.154 -0.028 -0.213 -0.189
[0.224] [0.150] [0.225] [0.210]
log (FDI) 0.033 0.028 0.038 0.051
[0.092] [0.046] [0.092] [0.091]
shocks -7.498*** -2.005 -6.834** -5.245**
[2.792] [1.352] [2.811] [2.448]
log (lag US wages) 11.183*** 5.765*** 10.318*** 11.791***
[3.272] [1.695] [3.329] [3.192]
log (number of native workers) 0.04 0.205* 0.077 0.044
[0.240] [0.120] [0.237] [0.228]
N 125 119 470 334 120 120 141 134
R-squared 0.13 0.29 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.22
log (visas/native workers)
Table A6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration  OLS, 
Robustness checks
In Columns [1] and [2], agriculture sector (industry code = 105) is dropped.  Year fixed effects and included in columns [3] and [4].  Columns [5] and [6]  restrict the number of 
observations to be the same across the regressions. In columns [7] and [8], industries with zero lobbying expenditures are included replacing log (0) with logs of the minimum 
values. All data are averaged over 2001-2005. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent respectively.
Drop agriculture Pooled OLS Dependent variable
Control for capital-labor ratio Control for skilled-unskilled labor ratio
[1] [2]
log (lobbying exp / native workers) 0.294*** 0.235***
[0.084] [0.072]




unemployment rate -0.012 -0.032
[0.216] [0.170]
log (price) 7.305 6.262
[5.832] [4.574]




log (lag US wages) -6.834** -1.929
[2.811] [2.381]
log (number of native workers) 10.318*** 1.04
[3.329] [3.240]
log (capital-labor intensity) -0.136 -0.248
[0.241] [0.159]





Table A7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration  OLS, 
Robustness checks
In Columns [1] and [2], the regressions control for capital-labor and skilled-unskilled labor intensities. All data are averaged over 2001-2005. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and denoted in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively.